Ukraine has successfully leveraged the advantages of remote piloting using bulky, non-stealthy, slow-flying piston-engined drones such as the UJ-22 and A22. These drones can operate in both remotely piloted and autonomous modes. Autonomous mode is generally used only for pre-programmed reconnaissance missions.

When used for strike missions, the drones are remotely piloted, facilitating better radar avoidance and more precise targeting.

Radar detection is most effectively avoided, not by stealth design but by flying lower than the radar horizon. To follow a more effective nap-of-the-earth (NOE) profile that minimizes the chances of radar detection, the Ukrainian drones visually avoid terrain. The remote pilot can see what lies ahead—high-tension cables, high ground, or buildings—and alter the drone’s flight path.

In contrast, autonomous terrain avoidance needs to account for navigational errors. As a result, cruise missiles generally fly much higher than they need to avoid terrain that they could crash into if they drift off track because of strong winds or navigational errors. As a result, cruise missiles end up being more prone to radar detection than larger, unstealthy drones.

Remote piloting also allows the pilot to positively identify the target and choose the best mode (kamikaze or bomb drop) of attack, and the optimum terminal path and trajectory. The results can be spectacular as compared to the accuracy of cruise missile attacks.

The Ukrainian Advantage

Remote piloting is possible only if a drone can stay connected to its operator. Satellite-based communication can allow a drone to remain connected with its operator, but satellite communication can be easily jammed by the adversary, something the Russians are particularly good at doing.

Ukraine has the perfect solution—Elon Musk’s Starlink communication satellite constellation. The constellation’s large number of satellites and physical spread make effective jamming difficult because of the redundancy provided by alternative communication pathways.

Russia doesn’t have a communication satellite constellation like the Starlink. It’s forced to rely on traditional satellite communication in which a large geographical area is covered by just one or two communication satellites, facilitating easy jamming.

Without a Starlink analog, Russia cannot use remotely piloted drones for attacks on Ukraine. It’s forced to rely on autonomous cruise missiles such as the 3M-14 Kalibre and the Kh-101.

Flying in autonomous mode, these missiles rely on a programmed flight profile that adjusts cruising altitude to the expected terrain below to avoid crashing into terrain.

The missiles are forced to fly at much greater heights than they need to, thereby exposing them to early radar detection and AD missile engagement.

The Russian Kalibr 3M-14 Cruise Missile, for example, is much smaller than a UJ-22 drone. It has a much stealthier design and flies almost seven times the speed of the drone.

Yet, statistics released by the General Staff of Ukraine on the effectiveness of its air defense indicate that the penetration rate of the Kaiber is just 50%. The penetration rate of the even stealthier Russian Kh-101 missile is worse, at around 30%!

Palyanytsia Limitations

The drone shown in the video is relatively small. In contrast to the 6.2m length of the Kalibr 3M-14 Cruise Missile, the Palyanytsia is just around 2m.

Ukrainian sources have claimed that the Palyanytsia is a long-range drone. However, even if it has a traditional turbojet engine, this is unlikely.

Conclusion

A strike drone equipped with a jet engine is more difficult to intercept because of its higher speed and more lethal because of its higher kinetic energy at the time of the target strike. Remote piloting makes the drone less susceptible to adversary interception and facilitates more accurate delivery of warheads.

This new class of weapons represents an advancement in Ukraine’s military capabilities.