Police vans park outside the National Assembly during the second round of the legislative elections in Paris, Sunday, July 7, 2024. France’s far right leader Marine Le Pen says the country is “in a quagmire” after the chaotic legislative elections have produced a fragmented parliament and a deeply divided society as Paris prepares to host the Olympic Games at the end of the month.

With nine days to the opening ceremony of the Paris Olympics, France's far-right leader Marine Le Pen said Wednesday that the deeply divided country is "in a quagmire” after chaotic legislative elections produced a fragmented parliament.

France has been on the brink of government paralysis since elections for the National Assembly earlier this month resulted in a split among three major political groupings: the New Popular Front leftist coalition, President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist allies and Le Pen's far-right National Rally party.

The New Popular Front won the most seats but fell well short of the majority needed to govern on its own. The leftist coalition’s three main parties, the hard-left France Unbowed, the Socialists and the Greens, have urged the president to turn to them to form the new government. Yet they are feuding over whom to choose as prime minister.

Macron on Tuesday accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Gabriel Attal and other ministers but asked Attal and other government members to handle affairs in a caretaker capacity until a new government is appointed. There is no firm timeline for when Macron must name a new prime minister, and it's not yet clear when he will do so.

“We are in the middle of a quagmire," Le Pen said Wednesday, a day before the new parliament is to meet.

Le Pen, a three-time presidential candidate and a leading far-right figure in France, blamed both Macron and the left for the post-election chaos.

She criticized Macron for failing to explain when he plans to replace Attal.

“The French people do not know what is happening,” Le Pen said in an interview with BFM TV.

The opening session of the 577-member National Assembly, France’s powerful lower house of parliament, is scheduled for Thursday.

The leftist alliance was hastily formed to run in the recent national legislative elections, which were called by Macron after his centrist allies suffered a massive defeat by Le Pen’s National Rally in the June vote to the European Parliament. It was a gamble Macron made seeking to prevent the far right from gaining power.

Leaders of four parties in the leftist alliance are calling on centrist and other left-wing lawmakers to form “a republican dam” in the National Assembly that would prevent Le Pen's National Rally from getting any leading positions in the parliament.

Voters, they argued in a Wednesday statement, have given them “an extremely clear mandate to firmly oppose the extreme right and its rise."

Le Pen accuses the left and Macron of anti-democratic behavior by denying her party’s elected lawmakers important positions in the parliament.

The left-wing alliance is doing “enormous harm to democracy,” she said.

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U.K., French Elections Could Herald a Paradoxical Alliance Shift

The left saw major electoral victories in both France and the United Kingdom over the past two weeks. After 14 years of successive Conservative governments, whose track record left a lot to be desired, British voters decided that they had enough, flocking both to Labour and to the insurgent Reform UK party, led by Nigel Farage.

Following a catastrophic performance of his own party, Renaissance, in France’s European Parliament election, President Emmanuel Macron felt compelled to call a snap parliamentary election, in which most observers expected the far-right National Rally, once led by Marine Le Pen, to do well. Yet, through a combination of strategic voting and an alliance bringing together left-leaning parties, the left-wing coalition of Greens, center-left socialists, and hard left France Unbowed came first, defying expectations and creating a conundrum for President Macron.

What does the shift to the left mean for the U.K.’s and France’s places in Western alliances? The answer is much more straightforward in the British case, where the Labour Party now enjoys a comfortable parliamentary majority—making Sir Keir Starmer’s government less beholden to fringe voices on the left—and where party elites spent years preparing for the present moment.

In Foreign Affairs, the new foreign secretary, David Lammy, outlines the case for “progressive realism” as the basis for the new government’s foreign policy. Its logic commits the U.K. to using “realist means” in pursuit of “progressive ends”: “countering climate change, defending democracy, and advancing the world’s economic development.”

Very little about this approach is actually new, but it is refreshing to see the British left move beyond a knee-jerk distrust of hard power and the trauma of former Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair’s support for the war in Iraq. “Inaction has high costs, too,” Lammy writes, citing President Barack Obama’s failure to police the U.S.’s own redline against the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Lammy also recognizes that in China the “state became more repressive as the economy opened up.”

Again, none of this represents a departure from a long-standing tradition of liberal internationalism that figures such Lammy share with moderate Democrats in the United States, or with mainstream social democrats and liberals across the EU. Brexit notwithstanding, the successive Tory governments have not really departed from the same general view of the world either—not even under the seemingly disruptive premiership of Boris Johnson. One can thus expect more continuity than change: The U.K. will continue to help Ukraine; it will prioritize its relationship with the United States, oftentimes flavored with a hint of neediness around its “special” character; and will continue to be committed to multilateralism on subjects such as climate change.

Even the changes of emphasis will be minor. Expressing a desire to play a larger role in European affairs and “reset” its relationship with the European Union, the U.K. will host this week’s summit of the European Political Community, a forum that allows it to engage with the EU and other European nations. Tory governments, too, were keen to use the summit as a springboard for its influence on the continent—especially on questions related to Ukraine and Eastern Europe more broadly. The binding constraint on British influence, both in Europe and in more distant theaters where the U.K. seeks to play a role (think AUKUS), is its economic weight and the resources available to its armed forces. Those have run thin under Conservative governments; whether Labour’s sprawling spending priorities will allow for a real military buildup remains to be seen.

The picture from the other side of the English Channel is far more uncertain. While the U.K. is a non-EU member trying to play a larger role in European affairs, France is a core EU state seemingly headed for a period of political dysfunction that will thwart Macron’s ambitions to establish France as Europe’s central player, filling the void left by Germany’s lethargic leadership.

For every article by David Lammy in Foreign Affairs, there are several Economist interviews in which Macron sketches out his strategic thinking, aimed at turning Europe into a superpower—obviously, with France at its helm.

Since his 2023 speech at a global security summit in Bratislava, Slovakia, Macron has made a deliberate effort to position France as an active player on NATO’s Eastern flank. In that speech, he expressed regret that the West had “sometimes missed opportunities to listen” to Eastern European warnings about Russia and promised to take their concerns more seriously. In the months that followed, France’s policy changed too, becoming much more outspoken in its support of Ukraine.

Unlike German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Macron has not shied away from controversial ideas, such as floating the possibility of deploying NATO troops in Ukraine. France has also joined the ranks of countries sending fighter jets—the Dassault Mirage 2000-5—to Ukraine. One may agree or disagree with the policy specifics, but Macron has stood out especially in the Western European context as a figure who thinks about Europe’s security and the transatlantic relationship strategically and with an appreciation of the looming political realities of the ever more likely second Trump administration.

Yet, unlike the U.K., France now lacks a viable governing majority. Its new legislature is split, roughly speaking, between a hard left-led bloc, a populist-nationalist bloc, and Macron’s centrist-technocratic coalition. A legislative majority eschewing the extremes would span from the Greens, through the Socialists and Macron’s Renaissance party, to the center-right Republicans, bringing along a number of smaller mainstream factions. Given that France has no real experience with coalition politics, such a scenario seems farfetched. What is more likely is a fragile minority cabinet, perhaps a technocratic one, which will try to find votes for its legislation in an ad hoc fashion.

The French constitution is deferential to the president on matters of foreign and defense policy. But just like in the U.K., the biggest obstacle to France’s helping Ukraine, or simply projecting power, is the state of its economy. With growth expected below 1 percent and little prospect of bolder structural reforms getting through in the final years of Macron’s presidency, it will be difficult to fund the military buildup that France needs as it responds to the worsening security situation in Europe.

In the immediate future, Europe and the EU might thus face a paradox: A country that has just left the bloc is keen to do more on the continent, while the EU’s two central players—France and Germany—are increasingly paralyzed and inward-looking. Together with the prospect of another Trump presidency, this will present some European governments with an intractable challenge—particularly those that were used to taking their strategic cues from Berlin, Paris, or Washington. To expect Westminster alone to fill that void seems a bridge too far, but here is to hoping that Sir Keir and Mr. Lammy will be part of the solution, rather than add to the problems of Europe’s security.

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 Lessons from the election in France

French far-right leader Marine Le Pen, right, arrives to pose with newly elected Parliament members of the National Rally party at the National Assembly, Wednesday, July 10, 2024, in Paris. French voters have given a broad leftist coalition the most parliamentary seats in a pivotal legislative election that has kept the far right from power but has put France in the unprecedented position of having no dominant political bloc in Parliament.

The recent French election was quite the roller coaster. President Emmanuel Macron, a self-styled centrist, chose to dissolve parliament and call a snap election in response to the surprisingly strong showing by the right in the European Parliament elections in June. In this way, Macron hoped to shore up his position against the right in preparation for the presidential election in 2027. Macron may now regret his decision.

There were two rounds to France’s recent parliamentary elections. In the first round, the rightist party, National Rally, or RN, shocked many by taking the lead. In the second round, Macron’s centrist coalition, Ensemble, and a coalition of leftist parties cooperated to pool their votes by withdrawing all but one candidate between them in each local election. The strategy worked, and the leftist coalition, the New Popular Front, or NFP, then pulled ahead of the RN in the final voting.

But the numbers tell the real tale, which is less a tale of a come-from-behind victory than a tale of enduring turmoil for France. The NFP/left holds 182 seats, Ensemble/center holds 163 seats, and RN/right holds 143 seats, with several other small parties holding the rest. With that almost tripartite division, who can govern? Who can even form a government? According to French law, there cannot be another parliamentary election for at least another year, so prolonged deadlock seems the most likely result.

The biggest loser was the center: The left and the right poles both gained in strength, the hallmark of increasing polarization in French society. Macron’s centrists have already ruled out working with the largest parties on the right and the left, which they deem as too extreme for their tastes, and the rejection has been mutual.

Arguably, given the gloomy outlook, it may be that the RN — the rightist party — benefits the most from this election. Given that the RN will probably remain in opposition to whatever shaky coalition Macron can cobble together between Ensemble and NFP, it will not be held responsible for what the government does — or fails to do — over the next three years, and will be in a better strategic position come 2027.

This is not hard to understand. Already the largest party in the NFP, France Unbowed has unveiled its policy agenda to great skepticism. It is proposing a 90% wealth tax on income over 400,000 euros, a lowering of the retirement age to 60 and an aggressive government spending increase, among other things. In response, Moody’s has warned that France’s credit rating will suffer if these policies are implemented.

Besides disputes over economic policy, the issues that galvanized more than 61% of the electorate to turn out for the French election include immigration, crime and antisemitism — and all three issues are integrally linked. France’s surge in crime has been largely driven by immigrants from Muslim-majority countries, as one independent scholar relates. Foreigners make up less than 8% of France’s population, but represent 24% of those in prison, according to 2020 government figures. In 2023, 77% of those arrested for rape in Paris were foreigners. National 2023 figures show foreigners were 40% of those arrested for vehicle thefts, and 38% of those arrested for burglaries.

In addition to deep discord over immigration, these issues also touch deep historical French tendencies, such as antisemitism. Ironically, given its origins, the RN has become a supporter of Israel, while the NFP has supported “from the river to the sea” rhetoric. I was stunned to learn that Serge Klarsfeld, one of the last surviving Nazi hunters of the postwar period, expressed openly that he would be voting for RN, and that he felt Jews in France had no alternative. One French rabbi urged young Jews in France to emigrate to Israel because “it seems France has no future for Jews.” These trends are very troubling.

What are the takeaways here for Americans? There are many, from the strategic to the philosophical. One strategic takeaway is that immigration is not a small issue — immigration is a powder keg. The right will gain, and eventually win, if immigration is not controlled. Not just the surprising performance of the RN in France but also rightist victories in other European nations, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy and Hungary and others, make this very plain.

A larger philosophical takeaway is that democracy is no panacea for what ails us politically. Lately I’ve seen the conflation of “threats to democracy” with victories by the right in fair and open elections. The idea being promulgated is, of course, that the right is inherently anti-democratic, and therefore when the right is elected, democracy is threatened. No, the election of rightist parties is simply one possible outcome under democracy, and must be taken in stride by all those who love democracy.

The more pressing threat is from a different source. Democracy cannot stop polarization; in fact, there’s a good case to be made that democracy inevitably and actively produces polarization. But polarization means democracy winds up deadlocked and impotent — paving the way for frustration, political violence and even the possible overthrow of democracy in favor of a system that can actually get things done. This thesis was laid out brilliantly by Amy Chua almost 20 years ago in her award-winning book “World on Fire.” Democracy cannot help but undermine itself, and that is its true philosophical tragedy.

France is just a few short steps ahead of us here in the States. The U.S. Congress is deadlocked, though the courts and the executive branch are not. However, with recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court severely curtailing the powers of the executive branch absent congressional mandate — which mandate is impossible to obtain, given congressional deadlock — French-level turmoil is surely coming our way.

Winston Churchill once quipped, “It has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried.” We smile at the quip, but at its heart is a sad truth.

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