Two sets of talks are going on—one in Cairo, one in New York—that might restart a cease-fire in Gaza and lead to the release of more Israeli hostages held by Hamas.

For several days now, CIA Director William Burns has been meeting with his Mossad counterpart and the prime minister of Qatar about a renewed hostage deal. Qatari officials have, in turn, held talks in Cairo with Egyptian officials and some leaders of Hamas. Reports are swirling about a possible deal for a one-week truce, during which time 40 more hostages would be freed and more corridors would be opened into Gaza for humanitarian aid. Israel supports the deal; Hamas is resisting it, demanding a cease-fire ahead of time, and talks continue.

At the same time, United Nations delegates from these and other countries have been trying to hammer out the text of a Security Council resolution that would call for a pause in the fighting and the release of more hostages—and that the United States would not veto.

The two negotiations are related. The point of a U.N. resolution would be to help facilitate, or at least not disrupt, a tangible deal on the ground. U.S. officials say both might produce results this week. If Hamas ultimately rejects the one-week truce, a passable U.N. resolution would at least put the U.S. on a moral high ground and make Hamas the clear rejectionist.

Success in one or both sets of talks is important, not only for its own sake—the inherent value of killing fewer civilians and freeing more hostages—but also for political reasons: within the U.S., within Israel, and between both countries and the rest of the world.

Israel is coming under heavy criticism for its incessant bombing campaign, which has killed at least 20,000 Gazans and displaced 1.9 million people, about 80 percent of the Gaza Strip’s population, from their homes. The criticism is coming even from strong supporters of Israel, including Germany (where support of Israel is government policy and antisemitism is a crime), the Pope, and a growing number of lawmakers and mid-level officials in the United States.

President Joe Biden’s persistent stalwart support for Israel is also damaging the United States’ reputation in the world—and his own popularity, and chances for reelection, at home. Biden and several of his top officials have publicly and privately urged Israeli officials to be more precise and surgical in their bombing campaigns in order to minimize civilian casualties. But Israel has continued its “high-intensity” air strikes, making him seem both complicit and weak-willed. (In some ways, this perception is unfair: Without Biden’s pressure, Israel would probably not have made any hostage-for-prisoner trades or allowed any humanitarian corridors, and Biden needed to embrace Israel up front for his pressure to have any effect.)

The last time the U.N. Security Council considered a resolution calling for a cease-fire in Gaza, on Dec. 8, the United States vetoed the measure—and was, more than that, the only one of the council’s 13 member states to vote against it. (Britain abstained; the others voted Aye.)

The U.S. had reasons for its veto. The resolution demanded an immediate cease-fire, as well as an immediate release of all hostages, but it didn’t link the two—didn’t make the cease-fire contingent on the hostage release, or outline, or even allow for, any plausible step-by-step process. Also, while it expressed “grave concern” over the “catastrophic … suffering of the Palestinian people,” it said nothing about Hamas’ murderous attack of Oct. 7, which triggered the war.

Nonetheless, it was embarrassing for the U.S.—and, on the homefront, for Biden personally—to appear so isolated from the rest of the world. Some drew comparisons—false and misleading, but persuasive to those who hadn’t actually read the resolution—between Washington’s veto of a resolution condemning Israel and Moscow’s veto of several resolutions condemning Russia’s bombing of civilians in Ukraine.

Intriguingly, an earlier Security Council resolution, on Nov. 15, was much more balanced and nuanced. The U.S. merely abstained on that vote, allowing it to pass. The council’s members are trying to draft a motion that incorporates much of the earlier motion’s language, updated to be consistent with whatever deal comes out of Cairo.

The same parties now trying to negotiate a temporary truce arranged a similar cease-fire almost a month ago—a four-day pause, which extended to seven days, during which time Hamas freed 110 hostages, Israel released 240 Palestinian prisoners, and the flow of humanitarian supplies coming into Gaza greatly increased. Biden had hoped that the deal could be extended further, to free more hostages and bring in more food and medical supplies—but also to buy enough time that Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and some of the neighboring Arab leaders could begin talks on a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Biden expressly hoped for a resumption of the long-dormant talks toward a two-state solution, but he said he was open to other possibilities.

Hopes for an enduring settlement seem very distant. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has never wanted, and has actively resisted, a Palestinian state on his border. Few Israeli citizens, especially after the Oct. 7 attack, are attracted to the notion either. Nor have any Palestinian leaders taken steps toward real peace talks in many years. Unlike Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, headquartered in the West Bank, at least recognizes the right of Israel to exist. But its leader, Mahmoud Abbas, is old, in poor health, and almost utterly without support from his people.

Regardless of where the war goes, disagreements have erupted between Biden and Netanyahu over who governs Gaza—and how the Gazan-Israeli border is secured—after the war is finished. Biden has talked about a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority (without saying how such a thing comes about). Not just Netanyahu, but also the other members of his unity wartime cabinet, oppose letting any Palestinian entity take over and say Israel must provide Gaza’s security (though they don’t explain how this is possible without reoccupying Gaza, which they say they don’t want to do). Others have mulled the idea of an international force, including neighboring Arab countries, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, occupying the rebuilding Gaza, but those countries don’t seem to want any part in such a force. In fact, they expressly avoided getting involved in Palestinian issues (except, sometimes, rhetorically) ever since Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank after winning the 1967 war.

It is widely suspected that Hamas launched its attack precisely because the neighboring Arab nations had long been ignoring Palestinians—Saudi Arabia was about to start talks toward “normalizing” relations with Israel, a step that would have sidelined their cause entirely—and the attack has put the cause back on the table. (The Arab leaders can’t criticize Hamas while it’s under attack from Israel, lest they spark rebellion among their own people, who are much more radical than they are.)

Then again, the Arab leaders, especially the Saudis, very much want to resume normalization with Israel—partly for trade and investment, partly to strengthen an alliance against their common enemy, Iran. This can’t happen until the war is stopped. The war isn’t likely to stop—not really stop—until Hamas is neutralized or Gaza is stabilized. In order to get back on the track they started, the Arab leaders might have to step up to the plate and responsibly pursue their real interests.