Three Red Sea underwater cables providing internet and telecommunications around the world have been cut as the waterway remains a target of Yemen’s Houthi rebels, officials said Monday. Meanwhile, a Houthi missile attack set a ship ablaze in the Gulf of Aden, but caused no injuries.

What cut the lines remains unclear. There has been concern about the cables being targeted in the Houthi campaign, which the rebels describe as an effort to pressure Israel to end its war on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis have denied attacking the lines, however.

While global shipping has already been disrupted through the Red Sea, a crucial route for cargo and energy shipments from Asia and the Middle East to Europe, the sabotage of telecommunication lines could further escalate the monthslong crisis.

The cut lines include Asia-Africa-Europe 1, the Europe India Gateway, Seacom and TGN-Gulf, Hong Kong-based HGC Global Communications said. It described the cuts as affecting 25% of the traffic flowing through the Red Sea. It described the Red Sea route as crucial for data moving from Asia to Europe and said it had begun rerouting traffic.

HGC Global Communications described the Seacom-TGN-Gulf line as being two separate cables when it is actually one at the area of the cut, according to Tim Stronge, a subsea cable expert with TeleGeography, a Washington-based telecommunications market research company.

Responding to questions from The Associated Press, Seacom said that “initial testing indicates the affected segment lies within Yemeni maritime jurisdictions in the Southern Red Sea.” It said it was rerouting the traffic that it was able to change, though some services were down.

The Houthi rebel group has denied any involvement in the damage to the infrastructure.

Tata Communications, part of the Indian conglomerate and behind the Seacom-TGN-Gulf line, told the AP that it “initiated immediate and appropriate remedial actions” after the line was cut.

“We invest in various cable consortiums to increase our diversity and hence in such situations of a cable cut or snag, we are able to automatically reroute our services,” Tata said.

Other firms behind those lines, which provide data to Africa, Asia and the Middle East, didn't immediately respond to queries Monday from the AP.

In early February, Yemen's internationally recognized government in exile alleged that the Houthis planned to attack the cables. The lines appeared to have been cut on Feb. 24, with the organization NetBlocks noticing internet access in the East African nation of Djibouti suffering from interruptions two days later. Seacom serves Djibouti.

But for their part, the Houthis have denied targeting the cables. The rebels blamed the disruptions on British and U.S. military operations, but didn't offer evidence to support the allegation and have made false claims in the past.

“The hostilities on Yemen by the British and U.S. naval military units caused a disruption in the submarine cables in the Red Sea, which jeopardized the security and safety of international communications and the normal flow of information,” the Houthi-controlled Transportation Ministry in Yemen's rebel-held capital, Sanaa, alleged.

Since November, the rebels have repeatedly targeted ships in the Red Sea and surrounding waters over the Israel-Hamas war. Those vessels have included at least one with cargo bound for Iran, the Houthis’ main benefactor, and an aid ship later bound for Houthi-controlled territory.

Despite more than a month and a half of U.S.-led airstrikes, Houthi rebels have remained capable of launching significant attacks. They include the attack last month on a cargo ship carrying fertilizer, the Rubymar, which sank on Saturday after drifting for several days, and the downing of an American drone worth tens of millions of dollars.

The Houthis insist their attacks will continue until Israel stops its combat operations in the Gaza Strip, which have enraged the wider Arab world and seen the Houthis gain international recognition.

Meanwhile, the British military's United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center on Monday separately warned of a new attack in the Gulf of Aden. The private security firm Ambrey described the vessel targeted as a Liberia-flagged, Israel-affiliated container ship that sustained damage and issued a distress call.

“The container ship reportedly encountered two explosions of which the first occurred at a ‘distance’ off its port quarter, while the second damaged the vessel’s accommodation block and a container leading,” Ambrey said. “The explosion further led to a fire onboard and the crew’s firefighting efforts were underway.”

Ambrey said no crew member on the ship had been injured.

Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree, a Houthi military spokesman, claimed the attack in a prerecorded statement. He identified the ship as the MSC Sky II, sailing for the Switzerland-based firm Mediterranean Shipping Co, but sought to link the vessel to Israel. The ship's details and last-known location corresponded to details about the attack.

The Houthis “will continue to prevent Israeli navigation or those heading to the ports of occupied Palestine until the aggression is stopped and the siege on the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip is lifted,” Saree said.

The U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet, which patrols the Middle East, and MSC didn't respond to questions about the attack.

It remains unclear how the Houthis could attack subsea cables themselves. The rebels aren't known to have the diving or salvage capability to target the lines, which sit hundreds of meters below the surface of the waterway.

However, subsea cables can be cut by anchors, including those dropped from some of the ships that have been disabled in attacks. A drifting ship with its anchor scraping the sea could be the culprit.

“Our team thinks it is plausible that it could have been affected by anchor dragging, due to the amount of marine traffic the region deals with and the low seabed in many parts of the Red Sea,” Seacom said. “This can only be confirmed once the repair ship is on site.”

There are 14 cables now running through the Red Sea, with another six planned, said Stronge, the subsea cable expert.

“We estimate that over 90% of communications between Europe and Asia traverse submarine cables in the Red Sea,” he said. “Fortunately, telecom operators have built a high degree of redundancy into the system — there are many cables traversing the Red Sea.”

Underwater internet cables cut in Red Sea area targeted by Houthis

Several underwater cables have been cut in the Red Sea, disrupting telecommunications networks in a key waterway that has been targeted by Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

Four of the 15 undersea cables in the area have been cut, affecting about a quarter of traffic between Asia, the Middle East and Europe, according to a statement by HGC Global Communications, a Hong Kong-based internet service provider.

HGC and other providers have been forced to reroute traffic, though the company did not say what caused the underwater lines to be severed.

Lines impacted include the Asia-Africa-Europe 1, the Europe India Gateway, Seacom and TGN-Gulf, HGC said.

Concerns have been raised by Yemen’s internationally recognised government that the Houthis, who have seized control of much of the country in an ongoing civil war, would target the cables, which are considered strategic global infrastructure.

The militant group has launched a spate of attacks in the Red Sea during recent months that have disrupted global shipping.

The Houthis, who say they are acting to pressure Israel to halt its war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, have denied having a hand in the damaged cables.

Underwater sea cables allow the world to get – and stay – online. They can be damaged unexpectedly in the event of natural disaster and also accidentally by sea vessels.

“Initial testing indicates the affected segment lies within Yemeni maritime jurisdictions in the southern Red Sea,” Seacom told the Associated Press. It said it was rerouting the traffic it was able to change, though some services were down.

In recent years, concerns have grown that China could target Taiwan by severing submarine cables with fishing trawlers and plunging part of the island into an internet blackout. Experts have highlighted concerns that such a tactic could be used in modern warfare.

Military Coalitions, Explained

In recent weeks U.S. forces made multiple airstrikes against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen in an effort to stop their disruption of commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

But the U.S. hasn’t done that work alone—it’s had the help of the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, and several other countries in carrying out those strikes. For most modern militaries, working with coalitions is the rule, not the exception.

What is a coalition?

In a coalition—“a temporary alliance of distinct parties, persons, or states for joint action,” according to Webster—the two key terms are “temporary” and “action.” One defines the “what” and the other the “why” of states with often disparate interests coming together to achieve some particular objective.

In a technical sense, coalitions differ in both level of commitment and legal standing from other multinational military groupings such as alliances, partnerships, or ad hoc combined operations. The U.S. National Defense Strategy defines allies as countries with which we have formal, long-term relationships and generally backed by treaties (NATO, for example), while partnerships usually focus on something mutually beneficial during a specific amount of time or for specific circumstances, as with the current Prosperity Guardian operation designed to prevent the Houthis in Yemen from interfering with freedom of navigation in and around the Red Sea. The most recent airstrikes conducted in Yemen were conducted by a subset of Prosperity Guardian participants and distinct from that mission—an example of  ad hoc operations involving two or more nations’ forces. This generally indicates a rift in the partnership or coalition over some combination of ends and means, allowing more aggressive members to act while providing plausible deniability or even a protest vote to more passive states.

In practice, partnerships and coalitions are mostly indistinguishable, with the latter sometimes considered more formal or enduring and the former allowing cover for some participants through looser definitions of what’s actually been agreed to. News outlets tend to use the terms coalition, partnership, or alliance interchangeably. So, while including the more formal “alliance” in that mix misses the mark, differentiating between partnerships and coalitions is a distinction without a difference for most audiences. And throwing “ad hoc” in front of any of those terms just implies shorter timelines and more specific short-term objectives.

Why a coalition?

Arguing against a coalition is easy when you’re the 600-pound gorilla in the room. They slow down decision making. They force compromises in ends and means. And, like any committee, they include personalities, animosities, and agendas that must be pleased, placated, and addressed. If you’re in a hurry with vital interests threatened, going it alone is certainly easier and often more effective if you’ve got the means to do it. The Cold War provided numerous examples of the U.S. taking this route, including Panama, Grenada, Iran, and many more limited interventions where the we had overwhelming military superiority and the cost of bringing others onboard carried limited benefits with potentially high diplomatic or material costs and risks.

But that’s not always the case, especially when overriding goals of international legitimacy or others’ national honor are important to the eventual end state. In that case, it may be best to spread the glory (or blame) by including stakeholders—real or perceived—and putting up with the inefficiencies and added costs that may involve. Iraq and Jordan, for example, are part of the anti-ISIS coalition because having a U.S. military presence and conducting combat operations on their soil would be humiliating to them if they didn’t share in decision-making. 

Coalitions also can have practical benefits. Logistics are much more manageable with access to ports and airfields in the conflict area, as demonstrated today by our use of numerous ports and airfields in Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. Local intelligence services often have a much better picture of facts on the ground. High-tempo operations may outpace U.S. local or regional capabilities. Diplomatic and personal contacts and access can be critical to prevent escalation or encourage resolution. For a military with global responsibilities like ours, even minor burden sharing in critical places or at critical times can make a significant difference in the cost/benefit analysis of intervention decision-making or eventual success.

Then there is the issue of legitimacy.

Whether it’s the combatting the old Axis of Evil or the current Axis of Resistance, having dozens of nations supporting your overall goals lends much more validity to your actions than just a few outlier regimes noisily working to upend the status quo. This can be true whether the coalition partners make real contributions to the military effort or are just providing moral or diplomatic support.

Do coalitions work?

Do-overs in war are rare. For that reason, there aren’t many counterfactuals to study and determine whether a particular conflict would have come out differently with or without a coalition. But it is possible to look back at history and examine some of the factors that contribute to success or failure in uniting states with some combination of overlapping and clashing national interests behind a set of defined military and diplomatic objectives.

But it’s difficult to determine whether, say,  Afghanistan would have worked out differently if the U.S. weren’t limited by differing and often restrictive rules of engagement among coalition partners. Having to constantly check which coalition partners could conduct what types of operations while still ensuring they did enough to report their contributions back home often tied U.S. forces’ hands and complicated decision making. Who knows what opportunities may have been missed? Would Vietnam have gone differently if we had convinced more regional partners of Domino theory arguments and got them more directly involved militarily or diplomatically? Could Japan, Indonesia, or even China have been enlisted to press Hanoi toward a peaceful solution if we were willing to compromise on some of our objectives, or even just better understand the objectives and motivations of both North and South Vietnam? Reasonable people will differ, and undoubtedly do. But since war is politics by other means, at least for democracies, coalition warfare is here to stay.