The battle for freedom of navigation in the Red Sea continues – and will do so for the foreseeable future. The reason is simple; it is easier for the Iran-backed Houthis to achieve their endstate of disrupting freedom of navigation than it is for the coalition to restore it.

Houthi fighters rallying in support of Gaza

The Houthis have the home team advantage. They know the sea and atmospheric conditions inside out, both of which favour the attacking side. Their intelligence apparatus, whilst basic, is well established. Despite its degradation by the US and UK strikes of Operation Poseidon Archer (OPA), it is still working. I just wouldn’t be volunteering to keep watches in their intelligence ship the MV Behshad.

They have a varied inventory of strike options including ballistic and cruise anti-ship missiles, land attack missiles, seemingly limitless drones, plentiful fast attack craft and occasional uncrewed surface vessels. They have learnt concealment, mobility and how to hide in civilian populations from their Iranian donors, making “issuing a beat down” very hard to do in practice.

Meanwhile, the coalition is…complex. There are a lot of players on the pitch and many are playing well, but some are playing a different sport and some have yet to decide which team they are on.

As of today, the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden has in it warships from the US, UK, France, Italy, South Korea, Spain, India (also out in numbers further east in the Gulf of Oman), Japan, Egypt, Israel, China and, of course, Iran. Ships are on the way from Greece, Germany, Denmark (the excellent Iver Huitfeldt), Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.

So you can see why Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), the US led defensive operation put in place to reassure shipping in December, is taking time to bed in. This is not uncommon. The early days of Combined Task Force 151’s efforts to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa took months if not years to settle, and act as a relevant comparison.

The EU answer to 151, Op Atalanta, likewise took ages to cohere and for some countries was just a box-ticking exercise. Neither 151 or Atalanta were under ballistic missile attack. Take away the US logistics machine from a high-intensity environment and you are wading into dangerous waters.

The Indian Navy is doing great work both in the Red Sea and in the wider ocean defending ships from attacks and assisting those in distress – they at least recognise that they need this strait open as a matter of priority. The Chinese lack of involvement is more peculiar: failing even to answer mayday calls is a pretty galling breech of maritime etiquette. Egypt are present, but in limited numbers and further north – many believe they should be doing more.

The one navy comparable to ours – if not better in terms of land attack options – are the French, who so far have proven erratic. They sent a ship immediately following the attacks, joined Prosperity Guardian and secured a shoot-down success of their own from FS Languedoc. Sadly, they quickly became politically unable to distinguish between supporting the US in their restoration of freedom of navigation and supporting them in the wider conflict, and threatened to leave OPG.

Now they are running back and forth escorting EU ships to their heart’s content and doing so successfully. Unfortunately, that’s like playing football during a rugby game and shouting “goal” when you bang one past the full-back and under the sticks. Great stuff, but you’re not really helping the team. An alliance where the solution is “everyone protect their own”, is not much of an alliance.

The Saudis have been reluctant to get involved for political reasons, including their ceasefire with the Houthis and gradual rapprochements with Iran and Israel. They do recognise that they can still play a role in interdicting Iranian weapons heading to Yemen and were keen to do so with some of the 58 fast ‘interceptor ships’ they had on order from France.

Predictably, the French, through their arms export office ODAS in Riyadh, reneged on so many parts of the deal that the Saudis refused to pay. The contract collapsed with just seven vessels delivered and the opportunity for a local ally to help in this key area was missed. If there are any Australian submariners in Riyadh just now, “we told you so” will be close to their lips.

Complex maritime operations are about teamwork. If political agendas make this impossible, for whatever reason, then the machine works less well. Your ability to reassure shipping and thus restore freedom of navigation is therefore diminished, whilst opportunities for the opposition to sow discord amongst allies increase. All the while, the potential for a catastrophic strike (we have been close twice now) remains high.

Compare all this to the Black Sea where shipping exports are restored to near pre-2022 invasion levels. Russia has been deterred to a level where shipping companies are now prepared to run the gauntlet. The Houthis have not.

There are differences, of course. An existential threat between two combatants, less prudence required from the defending side, land-based sea denial assets, cheaper cargo types, less risk-averse shipping companies, simpler civil-military liaison and the absence of a viable alternative route are all reasons why this is currently working in the Black Sea. And they have had much longer to develop the teamwork to make it so.

Unlike many, I don’t see the slow progress in the Red Sea as a failure of US leadership, especially when you consider the case they could build for not being there at all. This is a wicked problem where the odds are stacked against the defending side even before the wild complexities of the region are included.

Barring a diplomatic miracle, our ships and our people are going to be there for a while. The more some of these groups continue to run their own agendas there, the longer this phase will be. Meanwhile, prices of consumer goods continue to creep up and the ever-present chance of a miscalculation followed by massive escalation remains.

US renews strikes against Houthis in Yemen as Red Sea crisis continues

The News

The Iran-backed Houthi rebels said they struck a U.S. commercial vessel in the Red Sea this week, as the U.S. renewed strikes on targets in Yemen.

Attacks by the Houthis have plunged the global supply chain and some economies into chaos, as shipping companies avoid hostilities in the region and take a circuitous route around Africa, instead of the faster route through the critically important Suez Canal.

Red Sea crisis threatens major players in global trade like India

Around 50% of Indian exports and 30% of imports pass through the Red Sea, Indian outlet Firstpost reported. That makes the trade corridor crucial to the nation, and continued unrest in the region could threaten to downgrade India’s credit outlook in the coming year, the outlet noted. About 25% of outbound goods have been held back in India, while 95% of cargo ships from the country have opted for the lengthy route around the Cape of Good Hope, instead of through the Red Sea. “The Red Sea crisis, beyond being a security challenge, is testing the resilience of the Indian economy,” columnist Simantik Dowerah wrote.

Businesses are better prepared for Suez Canal disruptions after one of the world’s biggest shipping containers got stuck

Delays in the Suez Canal have caused issues for global supply chains before. In 2021, the canal was blocked for days by the Ever Given, one of the world’s largest shipping containers, that got stuck in the Suez, holding up $60 billion in trade. It took around two months for shipping to return to normal, but offered businesses a crash course in dealing with a crisis in the vital trade corridor. This time, “shippers can seek alternative routes or shipping mediums to get the goods where they need to be, which should prevent a more severe disruption from taking hold,” Wells Fargo’s chief economist said.

Israel will be battered by economic downturn for years after war

Israel enjoyed a two-decade period of relative peace, but the fallout of the war will likely cause an economic crisis in the nation that the younger generation has not experienced before, Haaretz economics editor David Rosenberg wrote in Foreign Policy. Israel’s credit outlook is poor, and will likely see fewer investments as companies that established themselves in the Middle Eastern tech hub look elsewhere.

The country is also facing a future brain drain as younger Israelis, disenfranchised by the political outlook and future military obligations, opt to move away. “It is safe to assume that the war marks the end of a 20-year era of peace … and the return to the more militarized state and society,” Rosenberg wrote. “The Israel of the coming years, if not longer, will look very different.”