• ## Key Actors and Methods in the Financing of Islamic Extremism in Nigeria and West Africa

    Islamic extremist groups operating in Nigeria and the broader West African region, notably Boko Haram factions (including JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), alongside Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the Sahel, sustain their activities through a complex and multifaceted network of financial and material support. Funding sources range from localized criminal activities and resource exploitation to international financial networks and support from global extremist organizations.

    **Key Funding Mechanisms:**

    * **Criminal Activities:** A primary revenue stream for these groups is direct criminal enterprise. This includes:
    * **Kidnapping for Ransom:** A highly lucrative tactic, targeting both locals and foreigners, generating significant income.
    * **Extortion and Taxation:** Imposing levies on local populations, businesses, and economic activities (such as farming, fishing, and trade) in areas under their control or influence. For instance, ISWAP is known to tax the lucrative fish and red pepper trade in the Lake Chad Basin.
    * **Bank Robberies and Looting:** Direct attacks on financial institutions and pillaging of communities.
    * **Trafficking:** Involvement in various forms of trafficking, including arms, drugs, and humans, often leveraging porous borders and existing criminal networks.
    * **Exploitation of Natural Resources:** Extremist groups exploit natural resources in areas they operate. This includes:
    * **Illegal Mining:** Particularly of gold in regions like the Sahel. Groups like JNIM have been linked to the control and taxation of artisanal gold mining sites.
    * **Control of Agricultural and Fishing Economies:** As seen with Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin, controlling and taxing these local industries provides substantial revenue.
    * **Local Support Networks:**
    * **Wealthy Sympathizers and Professionals:** Reports suggest that some local politicians, religious sympathizers, and wealthy professionals provide financial support to these groups, sometimes through "protection money."
    * **Bureau De Change Operators:** The Nigerian government has identified and arrested Bureau De Change operators involved in facilitating financial transactions for extremist groups.
    * **International Support and Networks:**
    * **ISIS Core Support to ISWAP:** ISWAP, as an affiliate of the Islamic State, reportedly receives financial backing from the ISIS core. This includes alleged monthly payments to fighters and funds to support governance-like activities in areas ISWAP controls.
    * **Foreign Donations and Remittances:** While often opaque, foreign donations and remittances from sympathizers abroad contribute to funding. These may be channeled through informal money transfer systems (like hawalas) or disguised through charitable organizations.
    * **Specific International Financing Cells:** A notable case involved a Boko Haram financing cell based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Six Nigerian individuals were convicted in the UAE and subsequently sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for establishing this cell, which funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to Boko Haram in Nigeria. Individuals like Abdurrahman Ado Musa were central to this network.
    * **Alleged Al-Qaeda Links:** Historically, Boko Haram was reported to have received initial funding from Al-Qaeda. While current direct financial ties are less clear, ideological affiliations and potential connections with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its successor JNIM remain a factor in the regional extremist landscape.

    **Identified Individuals and Entities:**

    * **Nigerian Government Actions:** The Nigerian government has arrested and sanctioned individuals suspected of terrorism financing. For instance, **Abdurrahaman Musa Ado** was designated by Nigeria's Sanctions Committee as a terrorist financier. The government has also spoken of uncovering a significant funding ring involving numerous individuals and businesses.
    * **U.S. Sanctions:** The United States has designated several individuals for supporting Boko Haram. Notably, six Nigerians linked to the UAE-based financing cell were sanctioned:
    * **Abdurrahman Ado Musa**
    * **Salihu Yusuf Adamu**
    * **Bashir Ali Yusuf**
    * **Muhammed Ibrahim Isa**
    * **Ibrahim Ali Alhassan**
    * **Surajo Abubakar Muhammad**
    These individuals were found guilty of transferring significant funds from Dubai to Boko Haram in Nigeria.
    * **Global Terrorist Organizations:** ISWAP is an officially recognized affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), and JNIM is aligned with Al-Qaeda. This affiliation implies a degree of command, control, and potentially material and financial support from these global entities, as evidenced by ISIS's financial backing of ISWAP.

    **Challenges in Countering Terrorism Financing:**

    Despite efforts by national governments and international bodies like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and the United Nations, disrupting terrorist financing in the region remains a significant challenge. These challenges include:

    * **Cash-Based Economies:** The prevalence of informal, cash-based economies makes tracking illicit financial flows difficult.
    * **Porous Borders:** Weak border security facilitates the movement of cash, goods, and individuals involved in illicit activities.
    * **Difficult Terrain and Ungoverned Spaces:** Large, remote, and often ungoverned or poorly governed areas provide safe havens for extremist groups to operate and generate funds.
    * **Difficulties in Prosecution:** Even when financiers are identified, securing convictions can be challenging due to legal and evidentiary hurdles.
    * **Adaptability of Terrorist Groups:** Extremist groups continually adapt their financing methods to circumvent counter-terrorism measures.

    **State Sponsors:**

    While specific states are not consistently and publicly named by international bodies as direct, ongoing sponsors of Islamic extremist groups in Nigeria and West Africa in the same vein as global state sponsorship designations, the complex geopolitical landscape means external influences and historic interventions (like the situation in Libya) are sometimes cited as contributing factors to regional instability that extremist groups exploit. The primary identified external financial support comes from transnational terrorist organizations like ISIS and networks of individuals, rather than direct state sponsorship in most public accounts.

    In conclusion, the financing of Islamic extremism in Nigeria and West Africa is a multifaceted issue, deeply intertwined with local criminal economies, regional instability, and international extremist networks. Efforts to counter this require a comprehensive approach that addresses both the local drivers of funding and the transnational financial flows supporting these groups.
    ## Key Actors and Methods in the Financing of Islamic Extremism in Nigeria and West Africa Islamic extremist groups operating in Nigeria and the broader West African region, notably Boko Haram factions (including JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), alongside Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the Sahel, sustain their activities through a complex and multifaceted network of financial and material support. Funding sources range from localized criminal activities and resource exploitation to international financial networks and support from global extremist organizations. **Key Funding Mechanisms:** * **Criminal Activities:** A primary revenue stream for these groups is direct criminal enterprise. This includes: * **Kidnapping for Ransom:** A highly lucrative tactic, targeting both locals and foreigners, generating significant income. * **Extortion and Taxation:** Imposing levies on local populations, businesses, and economic activities (such as farming, fishing, and trade) in areas under their control or influence. For instance, ISWAP is known to tax the lucrative fish and red pepper trade in the Lake Chad Basin. * **Bank Robberies and Looting:** Direct attacks on financial institutions and pillaging of communities. * **Trafficking:** Involvement in various forms of trafficking, including arms, drugs, and humans, often leveraging porous borders and existing criminal networks. * **Exploitation of Natural Resources:** Extremist groups exploit natural resources in areas they operate. This includes: * **Illegal Mining:** Particularly of gold in regions like the Sahel. Groups like JNIM have been linked to the control and taxation of artisanal gold mining sites. * **Control of Agricultural and Fishing Economies:** As seen with Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin, controlling and taxing these local industries provides substantial revenue. * **Local Support Networks:** * **Wealthy Sympathizers and Professionals:** Reports suggest that some local politicians, religious sympathizers, and wealthy professionals provide financial support to these groups, sometimes through "protection money." * **Bureau De Change Operators:** The Nigerian government has identified and arrested Bureau De Change operators involved in facilitating financial transactions for extremist groups. * **International Support and Networks:** * **ISIS Core Support to ISWAP:** ISWAP, as an affiliate of the Islamic State, reportedly receives financial backing from the ISIS core. This includes alleged monthly payments to fighters and funds to support governance-like activities in areas ISWAP controls. * **Foreign Donations and Remittances:** While often opaque, foreign donations and remittances from sympathizers abroad contribute to funding. These may be channeled through informal money transfer systems (like hawalas) or disguised through charitable organizations. * **Specific International Financing Cells:** A notable case involved a Boko Haram financing cell based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Six Nigerian individuals were convicted in the UAE and subsequently sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for establishing this cell, which funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to Boko Haram in Nigeria. Individuals like Abdurrahman Ado Musa were central to this network. * **Alleged Al-Qaeda Links:** Historically, Boko Haram was reported to have received initial funding from Al-Qaeda. While current direct financial ties are less clear, ideological affiliations and potential connections with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its successor JNIM remain a factor in the regional extremist landscape. **Identified Individuals and Entities:** * **Nigerian Government Actions:** The Nigerian government has arrested and sanctioned individuals suspected of terrorism financing. For instance, **Abdurrahaman Musa Ado** was designated by Nigeria's Sanctions Committee as a terrorist financier. The government has also spoken of uncovering a significant funding ring involving numerous individuals and businesses. * **U.S. Sanctions:** The United States has designated several individuals for supporting Boko Haram. Notably, six Nigerians linked to the UAE-based financing cell were sanctioned: * **Abdurrahman Ado Musa** * **Salihu Yusuf Adamu** * **Bashir Ali Yusuf** * **Muhammed Ibrahim Isa** * **Ibrahim Ali Alhassan** * **Surajo Abubakar Muhammad** These individuals were found guilty of transferring significant funds from Dubai to Boko Haram in Nigeria. * **Global Terrorist Organizations:** ISWAP is an officially recognized affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), and JNIM is aligned with Al-Qaeda. This affiliation implies a degree of command, control, and potentially material and financial support from these global entities, as evidenced by ISIS's financial backing of ISWAP. **Challenges in Countering Terrorism Financing:** Despite efforts by national governments and international bodies like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and the United Nations, disrupting terrorist financing in the region remains a significant challenge. These challenges include: * **Cash-Based Economies:** The prevalence of informal, cash-based economies makes tracking illicit financial flows difficult. * **Porous Borders:** Weak border security facilitates the movement of cash, goods, and individuals involved in illicit activities. * **Difficult Terrain and Ungoverned Spaces:** Large, remote, and often ungoverned or poorly governed areas provide safe havens for extremist groups to operate and generate funds. * **Difficulties in Prosecution:** Even when financiers are identified, securing convictions can be challenging due to legal and evidentiary hurdles. * **Adaptability of Terrorist Groups:** Extremist groups continually adapt their financing methods to circumvent counter-terrorism measures. **State Sponsors:** While specific states are not consistently and publicly named by international bodies as direct, ongoing sponsors of Islamic extremist groups in Nigeria and West Africa in the same vein as global state sponsorship designations, the complex geopolitical landscape means external influences and historic interventions (like the situation in Libya) are sometimes cited as contributing factors to regional instability that extremist groups exploit. The primary identified external financial support comes from transnational terrorist organizations like ISIS and networks of individuals, rather than direct state sponsorship in most public accounts. In conclusion, the financing of Islamic extremism in Nigeria and West Africa is a multifaceted issue, deeply intertwined with local criminal economies, regional instability, and international extremist networks. Efforts to counter this require a comprehensive approach that addresses both the local drivers of funding and the transnational financial flows supporting these groups.
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  • Sanction checks are essential for ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements and preventing businesses from doing business with prohibited or high-risk individuals as well as entities. #Sanction #checks can in preventing violations of international laws as well as protect against the hefty penalties, and help maintain the reputation of a #business. Particularly in areas like #finance, #healthcare, or #government, regular #screenings of sanction aid in ethical business practices, decrease the risk of fraud, and enhance the due diligence process.

    Read Blog: https://blogs.venops.com/learn-about-the-importance-of-sanction-checks/
    Sanction checks are essential for ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements and preventing businesses from doing business with prohibited or high-risk individuals as well as entities. #Sanction #checks can in preventing violations of international laws as well as protect against the hefty penalties, and help maintain the reputation of a #business. Particularly in areas like #finance, #healthcare, or #government, regular #screenings of sanction aid in ethical business practices, decrease the risk of fraud, and enhance the due diligence process. Read Blog: https://blogs.venops.com/learn-about-the-importance-of-sanction-checks/
    BLOGS.VENOPS.COM
    What are Sanction Checks and Why are they Important?
    Learn about the importance of sanction checks and how they save healthcare organizations from potential financial risks. Mitigate risk with regular OIG screening
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  • BRICS members economic outlook and poverty within each country and their loan payback situations.

    As of April 2025, the BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—face varied economic landscapes, poverty challenges, and debt situations.
    Here's an overview:​

    Brazil-
    Economic Outlook: Brazil's economy is projected to grow modestly in 2025, supported by agricultural exports and domestic consumption. However, global trade tensions and commodity price volatility pose risks.​

    Poverty: The poverty rate, based on US$6.85/day (PPP), decreased from 28.4% in 2021 to 24.3% in 2022, aided by social programs like Bolsa Família. Further reductions are anticipated with continued economic growth .​

    Debt Situation: Brazil's public debt remains high, necessitating fiscal discipline. Efforts are ongoing to balance social spending with debt management.​

    Russia-
    Economic Outlook: Russia's economy faces challenges due to international sanctions and fluctuating energy prices. Diversification efforts are underway to reduce reliance on energy exports.​

    Poverty: While official statistics are limited, economic pressures have likely impacted poverty levels, especially in rural areas.​

    Debt Situation: Russia maintains a relatively low public debt-to-GDP ratio, around 21%, providing some fiscal flexibility .​
    BRICS Journal of Economics

    India-
    Economic Outlook: India is expected to grow at a robust pace, driven by domestic consumption and digital infrastructure expansion. However, high borrowing costs may constrain fiscal stimulus efforts .​

    Poverty: India has made significant strides in poverty reduction, though disparities persist. Continued focus on inclusive growth is essential .​
    ORF Online

    Debt Situation: India's public debt is substantial, limiting the scope for aggressive fiscal interventions. Managing debt sustainability remains a priority.​

    China-
    Economic Outlook: China's GDP grew by 5.4% in Q1 2025, bolstered by strong exports ahead of increased U.S. tariffs. However, domestic challenges like a property sector slump and deflationary pressures are concerns .​

    Poverty: China has significantly reduced extreme poverty, though income inequality and rural-urban disparities remain areas of focus.​

    Debt Situation: Rising public debt, particularly at local government levels, poses risks. Authorities are balancing stimulus measures with debt containment efforts.​

    South Africa-
    Economic Outlook: South Africa's growth is modest, hindered by energy supply issues and structural constraints. Reforms are needed to boost investor confidence and economic performance.​

    Poverty: High unemployment and inequality contribute to persistent poverty levels. Social assistance programs are critical for vulnerable populations.​

    Debt Situation: Public debt levels are elevated, limiting fiscal space. Efforts to stabilize debt and implement structural reforms are ongoing.​

    Note: The BRICS bloc continues to explore initiatives like de-dollarization and enhanced financial cooperation to strengthen economic resilience and reduce dependency on traditional financial systems .​

    Brazil-
    Industrial Expansion: Brazilian industrialists are actively seeking opportunities within BRICS countries, notably India, to enhance trade and mutual investments. This initiative aims to capitalize on India's projected economic growth and foster greater industrial collaboration. ​
    Agência Brasil

    Agricultural Collaboration: At the 2025 BRICS+ Agriculture Investment and Trade Summit, Brazil and South Africa initiated cooperation in sugar production technology and rural farming systems. This partnership is expected to empower smallholder farmers and women-led cooperatives, potentially increasing employment in the agricultural sector. ​
    bricswomen.com

    Russia-
    Economic Outlook: Russia is focusing on strengthening ties within the BRICS alliance to drive economic growth, emphasizing the bloc's role in global economic development. ​
    Reuters

    Employment Initiatives: While specific employment programs are not detailed, Russia's emphasis on BRICS cooperation suggests potential job creation through joint projects and investments within the alliance.​
    Latest news & breaking headlines

    India-
    Defense Manufacturing: India is expanding its defense exports, offering affordable arms to countries traditionally reliant on Russian weaponry. This strategy not only boosts India's defense sector but also aims to create employment opportunities within the manufacturing industry. ​

    Digital Economy: India continues to invest in its digital economy, focusing on software development, e-commerce, and fintech. These sectors are significant contributors to employment, particularly among the youth. ​
    pharmsource.org

    China-
    Technological Advancements: China is investing in emerging technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, and smart manufacturing. These investments are part of the country's strategy to embrace the New Industrial Revolution, which is expected to generate new employment opportunities in high-tech industries. ​
    en.ndrc.gov.cn

    Infrastructure Development: Through initiatives like the Digital Silk Road, China is enhancing its technological infrastructure, which supports job creation in construction, engineering, and related sectors. ​
    pharmsource.org

    South Africa-
    Investment Mobilization: South Africa plans to mobilize approximately $109.4 billion in new investments from 2023 to 2028. These investments are directed towards industrial modernization, human capital expansion, and infrastructure development, all of which are expected to create employment opportunities. ​
    TV BRICS

    BRICS Inward Investment Missions: The country is hosting BRICS Inward Buying and Investment Missions to attract foreign investment and promote economic collaboration. These missions focus on sectors like manufacturing, agro-processing, pharmaceuticals, and automotive, aiming to stimulate job creation and economic growth. ​

    Overall, BRICS nations are leveraging intra-bloc cooperation and strategic investments to bolster local industries and employment. These efforts are integral to their broader economic development goals and aim to enhance their positions in the global economy.

    The BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—have increasingly turned to intra-BRICS financial mechanisms, particularly the New Development Bank (NDB), to fund development projects and reduce reliance on Western financial institutions like the IMF or World Bank.

    Here’s a breakdown of the benefits of BRICS loans and how capable each country is of repaying them:

    Benefits of BRICS Loans (especially via the New Development Bank):-
    Lower Conditionality-
    Unlike IMF or World Bank loans, BRICS loans often come with fewer political and economic reform conditions, allowing for more autonomy in how funds are used.

    Local Currency Lending-
    The NDB promotes lending in local currencies to reduce exchange rate risk and avoid dollar dependency, supporting national financial stability.

    Focus on Infrastructure & Development-
    Loans are often directed at infrastructure, green energy, transport, and water projects—investments that directly stimulate economic activity and job creation.

    Faster Disbursement-
    The NDB is often more agile in project approvals and disbursement compared to traditional institutions.

    Multipolar Finance Vision-
    BRICS lending supports a shift toward a more multipolar global economic order, with South-South cooperation at its core.

    Loan Repayment Capability by Country:-
    Brazil-
    Repayment Capacity: Moderate

    Brazil has a high public debt ratio (~74% of GDP), but solid export revenues (soy, iron ore, oil) and large FX reserves support repayment capacity. Political and fiscal reforms are crucial to sustaining debt servicing ability.

    Russia-
    Repayment Capacity: Strong

    Despite sanctions, Russia has low public debt (~21% of GDP) and strong energy export income. It has been pivoting toward BRICS and Asia for trade and finance, which buffers its repayment strength.

    India-
    Repayment Capacity: Strong

    India maintains a robust GDP growth trajectory (projected ~6–7% in 2025) and a growing tax base. Its high debt (~83% of GDP) is offset by its large economy and steady investor confidence. Repayment of multilateral loans remains on track.

    China-
    Repayment Capacity: Very Strong

    With the world’s second-largest economy and over $3 trillion in foreign reserves, China can easily service debts. Although it has internal financial risks (e.g., local government debt), its repayment capacity on international loans is solid.

    South Africa-
    Repayment Capacity: Weak to Moderate

    South Africa faces high public debt (~72% of GDP), sluggish growth, and unemployment over 30%. However, access to BRICS financing offers alternatives to austerity-heavy Western loans. Its capacity to repay depends on structural reforms and commodity prices.

    Conclusion
    BRICS loans offer flexible, development-focused financing with fewer strings attached. This helps member countries invest in long-term infrastructure without triggering immediate austerity. However, repayment capacity varies—China and India are best positioned, while South Africa and Brazil must manage debt carefully. Russia remains unique due to sanctions but retains financial strength from energy exports.
    BRICS members economic outlook and poverty within each country and their loan payback situations. As of April 2025, the BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—face varied economic landscapes, poverty challenges, and debt situations. Here's an overview:​ Brazil- Economic Outlook: Brazil's economy is projected to grow modestly in 2025, supported by agricultural exports and domestic consumption. However, global trade tensions and commodity price volatility pose risks.​ Poverty: The poverty rate, based on US$6.85/day (PPP), decreased from 28.4% in 2021 to 24.3% in 2022, aided by social programs like Bolsa Família. Further reductions are anticipated with continued economic growth .​ Debt Situation: Brazil's public debt remains high, necessitating fiscal discipline. Efforts are ongoing to balance social spending with debt management.​ Russia- Economic Outlook: Russia's economy faces challenges due to international sanctions and fluctuating energy prices. Diversification efforts are underway to reduce reliance on energy exports.​ Poverty: While official statistics are limited, economic pressures have likely impacted poverty levels, especially in rural areas.​ Debt Situation: Russia maintains a relatively low public debt-to-GDP ratio, around 21%, providing some fiscal flexibility .​ BRICS Journal of Economics India- Economic Outlook: India is expected to grow at a robust pace, driven by domestic consumption and digital infrastructure expansion. However, high borrowing costs may constrain fiscal stimulus efforts .​ Poverty: India has made significant strides in poverty reduction, though disparities persist. Continued focus on inclusive growth is essential .​ ORF Online Debt Situation: India's public debt is substantial, limiting the scope for aggressive fiscal interventions. Managing debt sustainability remains a priority.​ China- Economic Outlook: China's GDP grew by 5.4% in Q1 2025, bolstered by strong exports ahead of increased U.S. tariffs. However, domestic challenges like a property sector slump and deflationary pressures are concerns .​ Poverty: China has significantly reduced extreme poverty, though income inequality and rural-urban disparities remain areas of focus.​ Debt Situation: Rising public debt, particularly at local government levels, poses risks. Authorities are balancing stimulus measures with debt containment efforts.​ South Africa- Economic Outlook: South Africa's growth is modest, hindered by energy supply issues and structural constraints. Reforms are needed to boost investor confidence and economic performance.​ Poverty: High unemployment and inequality contribute to persistent poverty levels. Social assistance programs are critical for vulnerable populations.​ Debt Situation: Public debt levels are elevated, limiting fiscal space. Efforts to stabilize debt and implement structural reforms are ongoing.​ Note: The BRICS bloc continues to explore initiatives like de-dollarization and enhanced financial cooperation to strengthen economic resilience and reduce dependency on traditional financial systems .​ Brazil- Industrial Expansion: Brazilian industrialists are actively seeking opportunities within BRICS countries, notably India, to enhance trade and mutual investments. This initiative aims to capitalize on India's projected economic growth and foster greater industrial collaboration. ​ Agência Brasil Agricultural Collaboration: At the 2025 BRICS+ Agriculture Investment and Trade Summit, Brazil and South Africa initiated cooperation in sugar production technology and rural farming systems. This partnership is expected to empower smallholder farmers and women-led cooperatives, potentially increasing employment in the agricultural sector. ​ bricswomen.com Russia- Economic Outlook: Russia is focusing on strengthening ties within the BRICS alliance to drive economic growth, emphasizing the bloc's role in global economic development. ​ Reuters Employment Initiatives: While specific employment programs are not detailed, Russia's emphasis on BRICS cooperation suggests potential job creation through joint projects and investments within the alliance.​ Latest news & breaking headlines India- Defense Manufacturing: India is expanding its defense exports, offering affordable arms to countries traditionally reliant on Russian weaponry. This strategy not only boosts India's defense sector but also aims to create employment opportunities within the manufacturing industry. ​ Digital Economy: India continues to invest in its digital economy, focusing on software development, e-commerce, and fintech. These sectors are significant contributors to employment, particularly among the youth. ​ pharmsource.org China- Technological Advancements: China is investing in emerging technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, and smart manufacturing. These investments are part of the country's strategy to embrace the New Industrial Revolution, which is expected to generate new employment opportunities in high-tech industries. ​ en.ndrc.gov.cn Infrastructure Development: Through initiatives like the Digital Silk Road, China is enhancing its technological infrastructure, which supports job creation in construction, engineering, and related sectors. ​ pharmsource.org South Africa- Investment Mobilization: South Africa plans to mobilize approximately $109.4 billion in new investments from 2023 to 2028. These investments are directed towards industrial modernization, human capital expansion, and infrastructure development, all of which are expected to create employment opportunities. ​ TV BRICS BRICS Inward Investment Missions: The country is hosting BRICS Inward Buying and Investment Missions to attract foreign investment and promote economic collaboration. These missions focus on sectors like manufacturing, agro-processing, pharmaceuticals, and automotive, aiming to stimulate job creation and economic growth. ​ Overall, BRICS nations are leveraging intra-bloc cooperation and strategic investments to bolster local industries and employment. These efforts are integral to their broader economic development goals and aim to enhance their positions in the global economy. The BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—have increasingly turned to intra-BRICS financial mechanisms, particularly the New Development Bank (NDB), to fund development projects and reduce reliance on Western financial institutions like the IMF or World Bank. Here’s a breakdown of the benefits of BRICS loans and how capable each country is of repaying them: Benefits of BRICS Loans (especially via the New Development Bank):- Lower Conditionality- Unlike IMF or World Bank loans, BRICS loans often come with fewer political and economic reform conditions, allowing for more autonomy in how funds are used. Local Currency Lending- The NDB promotes lending in local currencies to reduce exchange rate risk and avoid dollar dependency, supporting national financial stability. Focus on Infrastructure & Development- Loans are often directed at infrastructure, green energy, transport, and water projects—investments that directly stimulate economic activity and job creation. Faster Disbursement- The NDB is often more agile in project approvals and disbursement compared to traditional institutions. Multipolar Finance Vision- BRICS lending supports a shift toward a more multipolar global economic order, with South-South cooperation at its core. Loan Repayment Capability by Country:- Brazil- Repayment Capacity: Moderate Brazil has a high public debt ratio (~74% of GDP), but solid export revenues (soy, iron ore, oil) and large FX reserves support repayment capacity. Political and fiscal reforms are crucial to sustaining debt servicing ability. Russia- Repayment Capacity: Strong Despite sanctions, Russia has low public debt (~21% of GDP) and strong energy export income. It has been pivoting toward BRICS and Asia for trade and finance, which buffers its repayment strength. India- Repayment Capacity: Strong India maintains a robust GDP growth trajectory (projected ~6–7% in 2025) and a growing tax base. Its high debt (~83% of GDP) is offset by its large economy and steady investor confidence. Repayment of multilateral loans remains on track. China- Repayment Capacity: Very Strong With the world’s second-largest economy and over $3 trillion in foreign reserves, China can easily service debts. Although it has internal financial risks (e.g., local government debt), its repayment capacity on international loans is solid. South Africa- Repayment Capacity: Weak to Moderate South Africa faces high public debt (~72% of GDP), sluggish growth, and unemployment over 30%. However, access to BRICS financing offers alternatives to austerity-heavy Western loans. Its capacity to repay depends on structural reforms and commodity prices. Conclusion BRICS loans offer flexible, development-focused financing with fewer strings attached. This helps member countries invest in long-term infrastructure without triggering immediate austerity. However, repayment capacity varies—China and India are best positioned, while South Africa and Brazil must manage debt carefully. Russia remains unique due to sanctions but retains financial strength from energy exports.
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  • Armenia: Cast Adrift in a Tough Neighborhood.
    On the day Azerbaijan’s military sliced through the defenses of an ethnic Armenian redoubt last week, American soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had just finished a training mission in nearby Armenia, a longtime ally of Russia that has been trying to reduce its nearly total dependence on Moscow for its security.

    The Americans unfurled a banner made up of the flags of the United States and Armenia, posed for photographs — and then left the country. At the same time, nearly 2,000 Russian “peacekeepers” were dealing with the mayhem unleashed by their earlier failure to keep the peace in the contested area, Nagorno-Karabakh, recognized internationally as being part of Azerbaijan.

    The timing of the U.S. soldiers’ rapid exit at the end of their training work — carried out under the intimidating name Eagle Partner but involving only 85 soldiers — had been scheduled for months.

    Yet, coinciding as it did with the host country’s greatest moment of need, it highlighted an inescapable reality for Armenia: While it might want to reduce its reliance on an untrustworthy Russian ally that, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, did nothing to prevent last week’s debacle, the West offers no plausible alternative.

    On Thursday, the defeated ethnic Armenian government of Nagorno-Karabakh formally dissolved itself and told residents they had no choice but to leave or to live under Azerbaijani rule, acknowledging a new reality enabled by Russian passivity and unhindered by Washington.

    The Biden administration rushed out two senior officials over the weekend to the Armenian capital, Yerevan, to offer comfort to Armenia’s embattled prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan. But it has so far resisted placing sanctions on Azerbaijan for a military assault that the State Department previously said it would not countenance.

    “We feel very alone and abandoned,” said Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Pashinyan’s former foreign minister.

    That is not a good position to be in for a country in the South Caucasus, a volatile region of the former Soviet Union where the destiny of small nations has for centuries been determined by the interests and ambitions of outside powers.

    “Mentally, we live in Europe, but geographically, we live in a very different place,” said Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Institute, a research group in Yerevan. “Our neighbors are not Switzerland and Luxembourg, but Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan.”

    This tough and predominantly Muslim neighborhood has meant that Armenia, intensely proud of its history as one of the world’s oldest Christian civilizations, has traditionally looked to Russia for protection, particularly since the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Empire, a perennial enemy of the Russian Empire.

    After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia in 1992 joined a Russian-led military alliance offering “collective security” and expanded close economic ties with Russia forged during the Soviet era. There are, by some estimates, more Armenians living in Russia than in their home country, which gets two-thirds of its energy from Russia.

    These intimate bonds, however, have now frayed so badly that some supporters of Pashinyan fear that Russia wants to capitalize on public anger and daily protests in Yerevan over the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to try to topple the Armenian leader for having let U.S. troops in to help train his army.

    The training mission was small and lasted just a few days, but that, along with other outreach to the West by Pashinyan — including a push to ratify a treaty that would make Russian President Vladimir Putin liable for arrest on suspicion of war crimes under a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court should he visit Armenia — infuriated Moscow.

    “They blew it out of all proportion,” said Mnatsakanyan, because “in their view, you are either their stooge or an American stooge.” Armenia, he said, never had any intention of “jumping to America.”

    “That is childish,” he added. “Playing simplistic geopolitical games, allowing ourselves to be the small change in global competition, is going to be at our cost.”

    But the cost for Armenia, whatever its intentions, has already been high and could get much higher if, as many fear, Azerbaijan, with support from Turkey and a wink and a nod from a distracted Russia, expands its ambitions and tries to snatch a chunk of Armenian territory to open up a land corridor to Nakhchivan, a patch of Azerbaijani territory inside Armenia’s borders.

    Benyamin Poghosyan, the former head of the Armenian Ministry of Defense’s research unit, said Azerbaijan’s conquest last week after more than three decades of on-off war in Nagorno-Karabakh “is not the end; it is just the start of another never-ending story.”

    Pashinyan has so far weathered noisy, daily protests outside his office that show little sign of gaining momentum — to the frustration of pro-Russia activists like Mika Badalyan, a journalist and agitator, who warned Wednesday that “we have very little time.”

    “All the talk about constitutional methods and impeachments,” he told his followers on the Telegram messaging app, “must be forgotten; Nikola will only be demolished by the street.”

    Russian state media has frothed with bile against the prime minister, routinely described as a traitor to his people and to Russia, and against the United States for feasting, in Moscow’s view, on Russia’s travails in Ukraine to lure away its friends. “American jackals,” screamed Sergei Karnaukhov, a commentator on state television.

    Tatul Hakobyan, an Armenian journalist who has known the prime minister for decades and meets with him regularly, said Russian state media and senior officials like former President Dmitry Medvedev were “openly supporting people in Armenia who want to topple Pashinyan.” But Putin, he added, has yet to show his hand.

    Many Armenians blame Russian inaction for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, accusing Moscow of abandoning its small ally in pursuit of bigger economic and diplomatic opportunities offered by Turkey and Azerbaijan.

    That Russia would realign its priorities in favor of a former Soviet satrap like Azerbaijan or Turkey, which it has long viewed as an impertinent interloper into former Soviet lands, is a sign of how much the war in Ukraine has rearranged and shrunk Russia’s horizons.

    “Azerbaijan and Turkey suddenly became a lot more important to Russia than we are because of the war in Ukraine,” Poghosyan said. “Russia is busy in Ukraine, and it doesn’t have a lot of interest in us.”

    In a bitter speech last weekend to mark Armenia’s independence day, Pashinyan said responsibility for the suffering of tens of thousands of terrified ethnic Armenians fleeing their conquered enclave lies “entirely” with Azerbaijan and “on the peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation in Nagorno-Karabakh.”

    Armenia, he added, “has never betrayed its allies,” but “the security systems and allies we have relied on for many years have set a task to demonstrate our vulnerabilities and justify the impossibility of the Armenian people to have an independent state.”

    For some of the more than 75,000 ethnic Armenians who had fled Nagorno-Karabakh by Thursday, the explanation for their plight is simple: Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia has neither large reserves of oil and gas nor control of vital transport routes to Iran, an important source of weapons and other support for Russia in Ukraine.

    “They succeed because they have oil and they buy everyone,” said Naver Grigoryan, a Nagorno-Karabakh musician who joined a cavalcade of cars and trucks carrying refugees into Armenia. “We have nothing. We can only talk.”

    Azerbaijan’s energy resources have also made it a vital partner for the European Union, whose hunger for energy as it tries to wean itself off deliveries from Russia make autocratic Azerbaijan a “reliable, trustworthy partner,” as a high-ranking EU official said last year.

    The EU has condemned Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh but has taken no concrete action.

    The Biden administration has stressed in the past that the use of force in Nagorno-Karabakh was “unacceptable.” Nevertheless, in a meeting with Pashinyan in Armenia this week, Samantha Power, the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, said only that the United States expressed support for his leadership and “reformist government.”

    Ashot Manutiyan, a retired mining engineer taking part in the protests against Pashinyan, said he was encouraged by the U.S.’ statements of support for Armenia’s government because they might suggest it was doomed.

    “Look what happened to Saakashvili,” he said, referring to the zealously pro-Western former president of neighboring Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili. “Where is he now? He is sick and in jail.”

    He cursed Russia for not intervening to stop Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh but said “small countries like Armenia” in Russia’s backyard can’t afford to “poke the bear, especially when it is sick” because of its war in Ukraine.
    Armenia: Cast Adrift in a Tough Neighborhood. On the day Azerbaijan’s military sliced through the defenses of an ethnic Armenian redoubt last week, American soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had just finished a training mission in nearby Armenia, a longtime ally of Russia that has been trying to reduce its nearly total dependence on Moscow for its security. The Americans unfurled a banner made up of the flags of the United States and Armenia, posed for photographs — and then left the country. At the same time, nearly 2,000 Russian “peacekeepers” were dealing with the mayhem unleashed by their earlier failure to keep the peace in the contested area, Nagorno-Karabakh, recognized internationally as being part of Azerbaijan. The timing of the U.S. soldiers’ rapid exit at the end of their training work — carried out under the intimidating name Eagle Partner but involving only 85 soldiers — had been scheduled for months. Yet, coinciding as it did with the host country’s greatest moment of need, it highlighted an inescapable reality for Armenia: While it might want to reduce its reliance on an untrustworthy Russian ally that, preoccupied by the war in Ukraine, did nothing to prevent last week’s debacle, the West offers no plausible alternative. On Thursday, the defeated ethnic Armenian government of Nagorno-Karabakh formally dissolved itself and told residents they had no choice but to leave or to live under Azerbaijani rule, acknowledging a new reality enabled by Russian passivity and unhindered by Washington. The Biden administration rushed out two senior officials over the weekend to the Armenian capital, Yerevan, to offer comfort to Armenia’s embattled prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan. But it has so far resisted placing sanctions on Azerbaijan for a military assault that the State Department previously said it would not countenance. “We feel very alone and abandoned,” said Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Pashinyan’s former foreign minister. That is not a good position to be in for a country in the South Caucasus, a volatile region of the former Soviet Union where the destiny of small nations has for centuries been determined by the interests and ambitions of outside powers. “Mentally, we live in Europe, but geographically, we live in a very different place,” said Alexander Iskandaryan, director of the Caucasus Institute, a research group in Yerevan. “Our neighbors are not Switzerland and Luxembourg, but Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan.” This tough and predominantly Muslim neighborhood has meant that Armenia, intensely proud of its history as one of the world’s oldest Christian civilizations, has traditionally looked to Russia for protection, particularly since the 1915 Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Empire, a perennial enemy of the Russian Empire. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia in 1992 joined a Russian-led military alliance offering “collective security” and expanded close economic ties with Russia forged during the Soviet era. There are, by some estimates, more Armenians living in Russia than in their home country, which gets two-thirds of its energy from Russia. These intimate bonds, however, have now frayed so badly that some supporters of Pashinyan fear that Russia wants to capitalize on public anger and daily protests in Yerevan over the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to try to topple the Armenian leader for having let U.S. troops in to help train his army. The training mission was small and lasted just a few days, but that, along with other outreach to the West by Pashinyan — including a push to ratify a treaty that would make Russian President Vladimir Putin liable for arrest on suspicion of war crimes under a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court should he visit Armenia — infuriated Moscow. “They blew it out of all proportion,” said Mnatsakanyan, because “in their view, you are either their stooge or an American stooge.” Armenia, he said, never had any intention of “jumping to America.” “That is childish,” he added. “Playing simplistic geopolitical games, allowing ourselves to be the small change in global competition, is going to be at our cost.” But the cost for Armenia, whatever its intentions, has already been high and could get much higher if, as many fear, Azerbaijan, with support from Turkey and a wink and a nod from a distracted Russia, expands its ambitions and tries to snatch a chunk of Armenian territory to open up a land corridor to Nakhchivan, a patch of Azerbaijani territory inside Armenia’s borders. Benyamin Poghosyan, the former head of the Armenian Ministry of Defense’s research unit, said Azerbaijan’s conquest last week after more than three decades of on-off war in Nagorno-Karabakh “is not the end; it is just the start of another never-ending story.” Pashinyan has so far weathered noisy, daily protests outside his office that show little sign of gaining momentum — to the frustration of pro-Russia activists like Mika Badalyan, a journalist and agitator, who warned Wednesday that “we have very little time.” “All the talk about constitutional methods and impeachments,” he told his followers on the Telegram messaging app, “must be forgotten; Nikola will only be demolished by the street.” Russian state media has frothed with bile against the prime minister, routinely described as a traitor to his people and to Russia, and against the United States for feasting, in Moscow’s view, on Russia’s travails in Ukraine to lure away its friends. “American jackals,” screamed Sergei Karnaukhov, a commentator on state television. Tatul Hakobyan, an Armenian journalist who has known the prime minister for decades and meets with him regularly, said Russian state media and senior officials like former President Dmitry Medvedev were “openly supporting people in Armenia who want to topple Pashinyan.” But Putin, he added, has yet to show his hand. Many Armenians blame Russian inaction for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, accusing Moscow of abandoning its small ally in pursuit of bigger economic and diplomatic opportunities offered by Turkey and Azerbaijan. That Russia would realign its priorities in favor of a former Soviet satrap like Azerbaijan or Turkey, which it has long viewed as an impertinent interloper into former Soviet lands, is a sign of how much the war in Ukraine has rearranged and shrunk Russia’s horizons. “Azerbaijan and Turkey suddenly became a lot more important to Russia than we are because of the war in Ukraine,” Poghosyan said. “Russia is busy in Ukraine, and it doesn’t have a lot of interest in us.” In a bitter speech last weekend to mark Armenia’s independence day, Pashinyan said responsibility for the suffering of tens of thousands of terrified ethnic Armenians fleeing their conquered enclave lies “entirely” with Azerbaijan and “on the peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation in Nagorno-Karabakh.” Armenia, he added, “has never betrayed its allies,” but “the security systems and allies we have relied on for many years have set a task to demonstrate our vulnerabilities and justify the impossibility of the Armenian people to have an independent state.” For some of the more than 75,000 ethnic Armenians who had fled Nagorno-Karabakh by Thursday, the explanation for their plight is simple: Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia has neither large reserves of oil and gas nor control of vital transport routes to Iran, an important source of weapons and other support for Russia in Ukraine. “They succeed because they have oil and they buy everyone,” said Naver Grigoryan, a Nagorno-Karabakh musician who joined a cavalcade of cars and trucks carrying refugees into Armenia. “We have nothing. We can only talk.” Azerbaijan’s energy resources have also made it a vital partner for the European Union, whose hunger for energy as it tries to wean itself off deliveries from Russia make autocratic Azerbaijan a “reliable, trustworthy partner,” as a high-ranking EU official said last year. The EU has condemned Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh but has taken no concrete action. The Biden administration has stressed in the past that the use of force in Nagorno-Karabakh was “unacceptable.” Nevertheless, in a meeting with Pashinyan in Armenia this week, Samantha Power, the head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, said only that the United States expressed support for his leadership and “reformist government.” Ashot Manutiyan, a retired mining engineer taking part in the protests against Pashinyan, said he was encouraged by the U.S.’ statements of support for Armenia’s government because they might suggest it was doomed. “Look what happened to Saakashvili,” he said, referring to the zealously pro-Western former president of neighboring Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili. “Where is he now? He is sick and in jail.” He cursed Russia for not intervening to stop Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh but said “small countries like Armenia” in Russia’s backyard can’t afford to “poke the bear, especially when it is sick” because of its war in Ukraine.
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