• The US military may be forced to confront a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without top allies.

• Japan, Australia, the UK and Canada are likely to provide no military forces to counter China.

• RAND Corp. analysts said these "middle powers" could help in other ways, however.

If the US decides to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion, it may have to do so alone.

Several of America's biggest allies are unlikely to commit troops to save Taiwan, either because they lack the military capability or don't want to risk all-out war with an increasingly formidable China, according to a new report by the RAND Corp..

For Japan, Australia, the UK and Canada, aid "would be confined to diplomatic support for Taiwan and endorsement of likely US sanctions on China," concluded RAND, an American think tank, which surveyed experts in the four nations. If this proves right, it means that any military response to a Chinese invasion would be limited to American forces.

"Our respondents believe that the US will receive logistics and materiel support from other countries, but its forces will have to go it alone in responding to an invasion by China," Rafiq Dossani, a RAND senior economist who co-authored the study, told Business Insider. However, there was more support in Japan and Australia to commit their navies to assisting an American-led effort to break a Chinese blockade of Taiwan.

That Canada, for example, might not be able or eager to rush to Taiwan's defense isn't a surprise. But for Japan, whose security would be gravely affected by a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the issue is more complicated.

"Despite its military power, commitment to the region, and US backing, Japanese pacifism (both popular and constitutional) and the fear of a retaliatory attack by China are likely to limit Japan's military support for Taiwan, perhaps only to logistics and supplies," RAND said. "Any support that they would offer to a US-led military response would likely be limited to logistics and materiel support."

The goal of the RAND study, which was sponsored by Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was to examine how America's medium-sized allies may deter or mediate a conflict between China and Taiwan, a democratic island that China's communist leaders consider a breakaway province. The US is highly dependent on its regional allies like South Korea and Japan for basing, but the prospect it would have to fight without their ships and troops against what's likely to be a larger Chinese force may tarnish its deterrent power.

Researchers classified Japan, Australia, the UK and Canada as "middle powers," which RAND defined as nations "that are not small but lack the sheer size and influence to significantly disrupt the global order." The study excluded nations that already faced a risk of direct conflict with China, the US and their respective allies. India and South Korea were also excluded "because those countries have declared that they will not play a mediating role in a cross-Strait conflict."

RAND sent questionnaires to 49 diplomats, defense officials, policy analysts, business executives, journalists and legislators in the four nations. The various responses shared "remarkably common" views about a China-Taiwan war.

What is especially striking is the pessimistic self-image. The British experts, for example, felt that "the UK's distant location and weak military assets, in addition to its trade dependence on China, lead to limited UK interest in defending Taiwan militarily."

Nor do the four US allies believe that Beijing fears them enough to refrain from attacking Taiwan. "Our respondents thought that China views these four middle-power countries as too weak militarily to take on China on their own and as marginal players in a US-led coalition," the report found.

On the other hand, America's top allies don't share American fears that a massive Chinese military buildup and Chinese leader Xi Jinping's avowed determination to "reunify" Taiwan with China are steps toward war, but rather may be nationalistic posturing. "According to our respondents, China's main goal is to legitimize its current domestic political system (i.e., the rule of the Chinese Communist Party)," the report said. "To accomplish this goal, China must be seen within as a great power, preeminent in Asia, and able to achieve high economic growth. An invasion of Taiwan would jeopardize such perceptions and thus be deemed an unacceptable risk relative to the status quo."

Taiwan's military is not inconsequential, with nearly 200,000 active-duty soldiers, anti-ship missiles and mines, and soon F-16 fighters and submarines. But this is a fraction of China's military might, and Taiwan would probably need outside assistance to repel an invasion or break a blockade. While the US would provide the bulk of such a relief effort, allied contributions would be vital, as would unfettered use of bases in Japan and Australia.

To American hardliners already resentful that some NATO nations aren't spending enough to defend Europe, the reluctance of its allies may smack of cowardice, and stick the US with the burden of Pacific security. But this may also reflect military and geographic reality. Canada's small military could muster only a token force for Taiwan's defense. Britain's shrinking armed forces, which already have European commitments, would struggle just to dispatch a small carrier task force 6,000 miles to the South China Sea.

Though Australia is a Pacific nation, and has diesel-electric submarines and F-35 stealth fighters, it still lacks the ability to project and sustain military operations 5,000 miles away in Taiwan.

But the biggest question mark is Japan: Okinawa is about 500 miles from Taiwan, Japan has territorial disputes with China over various islands in the East China Sea, and the Japanese military is rated among the 10 most powerful in the world. Furthermore, Japan's territory and the US military bases it hosts will be essential to any US effort to counter China.

Yet if Japan, Australia, Britain and Canada are reluctant to confront China, there are actions they can take to help Taiwan. RAND recommends that they create a joint plan for trade sanctions to deter China from attacking Taiwan. In addition, the four middle powers could play a role in mediators to prevent a Taiwan war from happening.

"Indeed, middle powers might be the only ones that can play a mediating role in such a conflict if tensions between the great powers were to escalate," the study noted. "However, as of this report's writing, no middle power has enough influence over both great powers to play such a role, even in coalition with other middle powers."

Which means these middle-ranked nations need to build up their capabilities, military and otherwise. "To build credibility with both great powers, the four middle powers need to rebuild and bolster their strategic autonomy, material power, and commitment to the Asia-Pacific region."

The study also implicitly raises questions about how much the US can count on its NATO allies for support outside Europe. While NATO nations did send small contingents during the Afghan war, confronting China is different.

"I think that NATO should take seriously the possibility of European middle powers preferring not to be involved in a conflict in which their adversary does not directly threaten their national security," Dossani said."

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Why a second Trump presidency would mean turmoil for Taiwan

Fresh from his election victory in 2016, then president-elect Donald Trump broke decades of US protocol by speaking directly with Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen. It was the first call of its kind since the 1979 diplomatic shift when Washington formally recognised the Chinese government and severed official ties with Taiwan.

Trump hinted at the time that the US might reconsider its commitment to the One-China Policy, through which it accepts that the administration in Beijing is the only official Chinese government, and acknowledges China’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.

But just as quickly as this call rattled the international community and the geopolitical balance of the Pacific region, there came an abrupt backtrack. In a subsequent call with Xi Jinping, Trump reassured the Chinese president that he was committed to maintaining the existing US policy after all.

This kind of inconsistency on thorny foreign policy issues characterised much of Trump’s first presidency, and Taiwan was given a worrying reminder of the episode this week when the Republican, pitching to be voted back into the White House this November, was asked whether he would defend the island in the event of an invasion from Beijing.

"Taiwan should pay us for defence," Trump said in an interview with Bloomberg Businessweek. "You know, we’re no different than an insurance company."

While it doesn’t have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the US has signed a treaty committing it to defend the island in case of attack. Though it maintains a policy of deliberate strategic ambiguity when it comes to what this would look like, it is by far the biggest provider of arms to the island’s democratically-elected administration.

The suggestion once again that he might upend America’s long-standing economic relationship with Taipei has set off alarm bells among observers and analysts in the region, raising serious questions about America’s commitment to the island’s defence at a time when the threat of an invasion from China has never been greater.

Sana Hashmi, a Taipei-based foreign relations expert, says it appears a second Trump presidency could see Taiwan “treated as a bargaining chip” for negotiations with China.

“A Trump presidency would likely create turmoil not only in Taiwan but also for several allies and like-minded countries,” Hashmi, a postdoctoral fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation, tells The Independent.

“His abrasive and unpredictable behaviour could disrupt the assurance that the Biden administration had been able to provide to countries concerned about the China threat.”

Raja Krishnamoorthi, a Democratic congressman and the ranking member of the House Select Committee on China, said pulling away from Taiwan would be a betrayal, calling it “illegal”.

“Former President Trump’s threat to abandon our nation’s longstanding, bipartisan commitments to Taiwan would mean betraying one of the world’s most vibrant democracies to the Chinese Communist Party,” he said.

“Failing to provide for Taiwan’s defence would not only be potentially illegal under the Taiwan Relations Act, it would be a betrayal of American values and our democratic institutions.”

Trump again drew a link between Taiwan’s security and US economic interests by suggesting that China could easily take over the island but has not done so because of its prized semiconductor industry, which makes the computer chips that power everything from smartphones to cars and satellites. The Republican leader accused the island of stealing “about 100 per cent of our chip business”.

The Taiwan issue is set to be one of the defining foreign policy challenges for whoever wins November’s US election, with China’s Xi ordering his military to be ready to take the island by force by 2027.

And Trump admitted he does not feel “so secure” over the situation in the Taiwan Strait, where Beijing has “been very aggressive and got ships all over the place”.

Put together, Trump’s comments to Bloomberg significantly dented the shares of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s largest chipmaker by sales, a sign of the destabilising influence he already wields on what is a fragile situation.

Experts said a second Trump presidency would only spell more uncertainty for Taiwan and its industries, particularly those relying on America for support.

“Trump’s presidency has proven to be unpredictable and liable to short-notice changes in policy. In this regard, the Taiwanese government will probably struggle to completely rely on the US backing,” says Barbara Kelemen, an expert on China’s security policy.

She says Trump appears to prefer “strategic flexibility” when it comes to foreign policy issues and hence his commitment to militarily defend Taiwan is likely to be less reliable than that of the previous administration – and to depend on several other factors.

Taiwan’s premier Cho Juang-tai reacted with a carefully-weighted response to Trump’s comments and highlighted good relations between US-Taiwan despite the lack of formal ties but promised to increase its capabilities to defend itself on its own.

“We’re willing to shoulder more responsibility. This is us defending ourselves,” Cho said. “We’re very grateful” for US support, he added.

Though it is not new for Trump to make such comments about Taiwan his latest rhetoric could mean bigger ramifications for Taiwan as the Chinese military has ratcheted up exercises near what president Xi Jinping views as the mainland’s lost territory.

“Taiwan is accustomed to this and preparing for another Trump presidency,” Hashmi says, adding that during Biden’s presidency, it became evident that the US was exploring ways to defend Taiwan in case of an unprovoked invasion.

Derek Grossman, a defence analyst, tells The Independent that “Trump 1.0 was chock-full of folks who supported the defence of Taiwan, even if the president himself didn’t support it.”

However, Washington’s support for Taipei would depend on America’s position in the world at the time, the state of US-China relations, and whether Taiwan declared independence, thereby provoking Beijing.

“Trump has never been a fan of defending Taiwan, and his latest comments simply reconfirm that his position is quite dug in. One can only wonder what this means for US allies and partners globally,” he says.

It is unclear what sums Trump has in mind when he suggests Taiwan pay more to the US. The island already pays for nearly all of its weapon imports from US manufacturers, although the Biden administration has begun directly transferring some military equipment to Taiwan from US stockpiles.

In June, the House of Representatives approved $500m in foreign military financing for Taiwan to bolster its defence against China, along with $2bn in loans and loan guarantees. The US also approved $300m for spare and repair parts for Taiwan’s F-16 fighter jets.

China has blistered over the arms sales and transfers in funding to Taiwan, with its foreign ministry suspending tentative nuclear arms control discussions with Washington on Wednesday.

Experts say Trump’s comments suggest a transactional approach to shielding the island from the Communist Party in China, and mean Taipei will need to diversify its attention to partners beyond the US while focusing on building its own capabilities.

“This is undoubtedly going to result in an unpredictable US-Taiwan policy,” Hashmi says, adding that bipartisan support for Taiwan in the US could offer some consolation, although that is alone is not sufficient.

What adds to the worries is that Taiwan has a backlog of arms deliveries from the US valued at approximately $19bn, which US officials and politicians have repeatedly pledged to expedite. And there are no legal guarantees that a new resident of the White House couldn’t cancel these transfers by executive order, if they deemed it to be in the US’s interests.

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